Korean peninsula divided with the 'nationalistic, ideological, and power realities' in place that had created the war. 13 The peninsula was primed for further conflict.
Following a post-Stalin chill, the Soviet Union wished to rebuild its relationship with North Korea. The United States had been providing South Korea with modern military equipment, and Kim did not want his military capacity to fall behind. He accepted the Soviet thaw, and following the visit of Soviet premier Alexej Kosygin to Pyongyang in February 1965, concluded an agreement for free military aid, including current air defense technology, that was followed by an agreement for economic aid. 14 After the agreement was signed, North Korea became very sensitive to foreign aircraft and vessels operating near its coast, a trend that continued with the North Korean Navy sinking South Korean vessels in the Sea of Japan in 1966 and the subsequent capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968. 15 Cutting off the Limbs of US Imperialism Everywhere Further, the memo writers believed that Pyongyang was hoping to force the United States to intervene with South Korean forces to prevent a repetition of a 26 October raid of 30 South Korean troops into the DMZ. 19 Two days later, General Bonesteel reported:
Our ability to effectively cope with the NK aggressive killer-patrol actions in or near the DMZ is not as good as I'd like it to be. There are three major reasons: (a) the NK flagrant violations of the DMZ while we abide by it and require the ROK's to do likewise; (b) the basic military difficulty of reacting effectively against guerrilla hit and run tactics at NK's initiative, usually at night, in a 150 mile band of generally rugged terrain covered now with fairly dense vegetation and natural cover and from which the DMZ offers an immediate sanctuary (this is what is very seriously intensifying ROK frustration, anger and desire to make retaliatory raids); and (c) inexperienced soldiers and junior leaders.
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In May 1966, Mao had instituted his Cultural Revolution to rid China of 'revisionists' and preserve 'true' Communist ideology, which resulted in China's isolation from the Soviet Union and its neighbor, North Korea. Indeed, the North Korean and Chinese brands of communism initiated an open rivalry. 21 In October 1966, a Chinese Red Guard newspaper labeled North Korea 'revisionist' with 'alleged "anti-Chinese" behavior,' 'tantamount to calling the North Korean leadership pseudo-socialist, like its Moscow equivalent, and therefore illegitimate and worthy of being replaced. The author however, noted that neither side had 'intentions to trigger a conflict.' 27 The rift between the Chinese and North Korean governments continued to widen. In March 1967, the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang reported that, 'Events in China associated with the so-called "Cultural Revolution" have seriously alarmed the Korean leadership, which has reason to fear its negative influence on the DPRK.' Further, 'The Korean comrades speak of the "thousands of victims" during the so-called "revolution," the "suicides," the "political chaos," and the "chaos in the economy," He then might open the option of conventional air strike and ground attack a la Israel, assuming we would not use nuclear weapons. This is expected to heat up considerably by next summer.' 43 Bonesteel had submitted through Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for US$40m in additional defensive equipment, but Foster was skeptical that these funds would be enough even to start, but that Bonesteel was trying to keep his requests to a minimum. Foster added that the services' Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was currently designing a counterinfiltration system. 44 Three weeks later, President Johnson met with President Park in Australia, and
Johnson agreed to 'the most accelerated possible delivery dates for equipment' to defend South Korea. 45 Walt Rostow summarized the agreements from the Australia meeting for President Johnson:
The United States agreed to provide to South Korea with one destroyer as soon as possible, and in 1968, one helicopter company, equipment for a counter-infiltration counter-guerrilla operation, equipment support for eight ROK battalions for use in counter-infiltration activities, one battalion of self-propelled eight-inch Howitzers, and one light division of 11,000 US soldiers. 46 The Intelligence with a new Data Processing Department responsible for intelligence production support.
The outcome of this new department was the creation of the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) designed to provide intelligence database systems for ships at sea. Initially, it would be aircraft carriers that used this system to communicate real-time intelligence with the Fleet Intelligence Centers.
In 1965 the Navy embarked on a large scale SIGINT operation to support the war in Vietnam.
Indeed, the operational intelligence needs of Vietnam helped drive NSA and the national SIGINT community into tactical support for the first time. 55 Aircraft carriers and other warships were converted for SIGINT, however these ships were valuable for war, difficult to conceal, bound by maritime regulations, and judged to be threatening to foreign nations. Aircraft were also used for SIGINT, but these aircraft could be shot down -during the first two years of NSA's existence, five SIGINT reconnaissance planes were shot down or diverted including a Boeing RB-50 over the Sea of Japan on 19
July 1953, resulting in the loss of the lives of 16 crewmen. 56 To create a viable intelligence collecting platform, the United States would emulate the Soviet use of converted cargo vessels -Soviet Naval Auxiliary Intelligence Collectors (AGIs). 57 These small ships were relatively inexpensive to convert and operate, they were mobile, generally nonthreatening, and could operate 24-hours a day, for days at a time. These loitering SIGINT collectors could acquire data that ground, air, and space based SIGINT collectors could not. Soviet and North Korean activities in the Sea of Japan would be a prime target for this type of intelligence platform.
Sea-borne Intelligence
In 1961, the NSA commissioned its first SIGINT ship, Fich to establish a small fleet of intelligence gathering ships for the Navy. 62 The group agreed to request funds for small ships to be converted for SIGINT, and Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Harold Brown and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance approved the plan. 63 In August 1965, the Office of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) specified the directives for the new program already underway, Operation CLICKBEETLE, of 'seaborne surveillance by a small ship acting singly.' 64 Each mission would originate and be under the control of the Commander of US Naval Forces, Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN) at the Yokosuka Naval Base, south of Tokyo.
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and a subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC) would approve each mission before the JCS authorized COMNAVFORJAPAN to enact the mission. 66 During the 1960s, the Soviet Union had increased its production of submarines, with ever increasing abilities and cruise missiles which were a major threat to the US Navy. 67 Monitoring the Soviet Navy in the Pacific, based in Vladivostok, was difficult, and the United States used submarines to monitor SIGINT and ELINT with minimal success. 68 Following the commission of the first SIGINT collection ship, the USS Banner, on 7
October 1965, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze contacted Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for intelligence on 'the operating capabilities, tactical doctrine, procedures, and state of training of the Soviet Navy,' and required two additional vessels. 69 The three ships -designated Auxiliary General
Environmental Research (AGER) vessels -were all former light cargo-ships, approximately 180 feet long with a top speed of 13 knots, USS Banner (AGER-1), the USS Pueblo (AGER-2), and the USS Palm Beach (AGER-3). 70 Following the guidelines put forth in 1953, NAVSECGRU would have control of the naval component of each ship including personnel, and NSA would be responsible for the SIGINT functions. 71 Due to the small size of the AGER ships, each could only carry small amounts of SIGINT equipment and personnel. This limited the analytic capabilities of the platform, and 'most intercepted communications were therefore forwarded to NSA for more detailed analysis.' 72 This detail increased the danger of each mission through limiting the intelligence on board the vessel. Hokkaido and the main island of Honshu. Twice, on 13 November and again on 24 November, the Banner crossed into Soviet claimed waters near Vladivostok, home of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. 78 The
Soviet Union claimed the Tumen-Cape Povorotny Line, protecting Vladivostok from surveillance. 79 On the first instance, the Soviet navy confronted the Banner with a KRUPNY class warship -a guided missile destroyer -and the Banner withdrew. On the second instance, the Banner was monitored by a Soviet SIGINT Trawler but was not challenged to withdraw. Both SIGINT vessels 'gave each other a thorough intelligence inspection,' after which the Banner departed from its operational area and arrived back in Yokosuka on 28 November. 80 The in the vicinity of Tongjoson-man Bay for two days. 82 On the eastern edge of this bay is the small island of Mayang-Do, home of the North Korean submarine base. 83 As discussed in the previous section, the CIA had reported its concerns over the growing threat of North Korean aggression. Banner for its first use on the sea. 86 BRIGAND was able to display an image the target radar had acquired on an electronic map, or Planned Position Indicator (PPI), and proved valuable to naval intelligence collection. In addition to the successful use of BRIGAND, the Banner engaged a Soviet ECHO class submarine and three Soviet naval vessels engaged in antisubmarine warfare exercises. The Soviet ships harassed the Banner and threatened to fire on it, but after two days, departed. During this operation, the Banner did monitor the coast of North Korea, but was unable to acquire additional intelligence. 
Pueblo Mission
The operations of the USS Pueblo were part of our national effort to gain information concerning our potential enemies. The According to the NSA, 'the US intelligence gap against North Korea was in the area of indications and warning information. US intelligence users also lacked complete information on North Korean military and naval targets,' and the NSA believed that a more mobile platform like the Pueblo and Banner, would be able to access short-range communications for information needed to fill the intelligence gaps. 92 The North Korean Army used manual Morse, radiotelephone, and radioprinter for communications from the Ministry of National Defense through battalion and lower levels, especially for operational messages. 93 Analysis of this traffic analysis could illustrate impending military action. 94 Additionally, the NSA wanted the Pueblo to conduct surveillance along the northern part of the peninsula to ascertain if North Korea had installed additional surface-to-air cruise missile batteries to strengthen its coastal defenses and use intercepted signals to identify their locations. 95 The Navy, according to Lerner, wished to 'obtain details on the North Korean submarine fleet thought to be stationed near Mayong-do [sic], and there was also some hope of encountering one of a new class of Soviet submarines' operating along the Korean coast. 96 Lerner continues, correctly, that the Pueblo would also 'obtain information on the nature, location, and frequency of DPRK radar, which would be especially helpful in responding to another North Korean attack on the South.'
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With a tighter focus on North Korea, the Navy created a new mission, code named ICHTHYIC (PINK ROOT). 98 The mission of the Pueblo, ICHTHYIC ONE (PINK ROOT ONE) -was to North Korean Navy ship reported to its base that the Pueblo was an intelligence gathering vessel of the United States, and within hours the Pueblo was encircled by North Korean vessels and signaled, "Heave to or I will open fire." Bucher knew that these would be the tactics based on the earlier missions of the Banner, and the Pueblo informed the North Koreans that they were in international waters and intended to proceed. When one North Korean ship came alongside the Pueblo with armed men, the Pueblo attempted to maneuver out to sea, but the North Koreans moved in close and began firing on the Pueblo's superstructure, killing one man and wounding Bucher. The Pueblo crew began to destroy its intelligence gathering equipment and documents, but the destruction equipment was inadequate.
Desperate messages were sent to Kamiseya, but there was no time to send help to the Pueblo, and the North Koreans began a slow escort toward Wonsan -to enter North Korean waters prior to boarding.
Following the armed boarding, the crewmen of the Pueblo were blindfolded and their harrowing months of detention and interrogation began -the highest level of NSA intelligence gathering equipment and documents were now in the hands of the North Koreans. 102 The capture of the Pueblo was terrible for the United States. However, its mission was within the parameters set by the Navy and the NSA, and it was there to collect information deemed vital to the US government. Cold War tensions were extremely high, the situation in Vietnam was spiraling into chaos, and North Korea was seemingly moving toward ever increasing hostility toward South Korea. The
United States could not be surprised as it had been on 25 June 1950, and needed the Pueblo to collecting SIGINT intelligence on North Korea to confirm a crystallization of war on the Korean peninsula, unfortunately the North Koreans found this intolerable and disaster ensued. 103 
Conclusion
In 1968, the USS Pueblo was operating in the Sea of Japan to collect intelligence on an ever Pueblo was on its first and only mission. Its small size limited the capacity for detailed analysis of intercepted data, which was transmitted to the NSA. In the 1960s, data analysis took considerable time to complete, and it would be a month after the seizure that the NSA used the Pueblo's own transmitted intercepts to illustrate her last fateful days.
